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Abstract
The mood-as-input hypothesis (MAIH) has been consistently examined in relation to worry, but
few studies have examined its role in depressive rumination. Fewer studies have examined
congruency effects, such that conditions of mood and perseverative task are congruent (i.e.,
negative mood and negative preservative task vs. positive mood and positive perseverative task).
The current study thus examines the MAIH’s applicability to depressive rumination, includes
further investigation on mood congruency, and incorporates a newly constructed positive
rumination task to further assess the impact of the valency of a ruminative task. Undergraduate
students were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions based on the rumination interview
type (positive vs. negative), mood (happy vs. sad), and stop-rule (as-many-as-can (AMA) and
feel-like-stopping (FL)). It was hypothesized that participants would generate more perseverative
steps in mood-congruent conditions, depending on the assigned stop-rules, and that they would
default to that assigned stop-rule in mood-incongruent conditions. Results determined that, under
mood-congruent conditions, participants generated more perseverative steps. In particular, they
ruminated more if assigned to the AMA stop-rule while in the negative rumination interview and
primed with sad mood, whereas more rumination also occurred for participants with the FL stoprule while in the positive rumination interview and primed with happy mood. These findings are
consistent with the MAIH. As hypothesized, participants also defaulted to the AMA stop-rule
under mood-incongruent conditions. The current study’s findings show support for the body of
research relating to the MAIH, but also provides additional findings in the limited studies
regarding congruency and the lack of research surrounding positive rumination.
Keywords: rumination, stop rules, catastrophizing, depression, congruency
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Depressive Rumination and the Mood-as-Input
Hypothesis: The Role of Reverse Catastrophizing
Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is characterized by a diminished interest in most
activities, excessive feelings of worthlessness, lessened ability to concentrate, and recurring
depressed mood with symptoms occurring nearly every day (American Psychiatric Association,
2013). The twelve-month prevalence of MDD is estimated to be approximately 7% in the United
States and is approximately three times higher for individuals in the 18- to 29-year age group
than that of individuals over the age of 60 (APA, 2013).
A variety of effective treatments have been created to combat symptoms of MDD and the
debilitating effects of this disorder. Nevertheless, remission rates fall below 30% or less, even
with treatment (Ansseau, Demyttenaere, Heyrman, Migeotte, Leyman, & Mignon, 2009). Studies
have found numerous predictors of the persistence of depression, such as the number of previous
depressive episodes (Sargeant, Bruce, Florio, & Weissman, 1990), absence of early response
(Mulder, Joyce, Frampton, Luty, & Sullivan, 2006), and depression severity (Barkow, Maier,
Üstün, Gänsicke, Wittchen, & Heun, 2003). More research is needed, however, to increase
understanding of mechanisms that maintain depression, such as rumination, which is best
described as a pattern of preservative-type thinking about an individual’s distress-inducing
subject and the causes and implications of their distress (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Rumination is
particularly important to consider as it has been shown to directly maintain depression (NolenHoeksema, 2000), and a longitudinal study on a large sample also found that biological, social,
and circumstantial risk factors of depression were mediated by psychological processes,
including rumination (Kinderman, Schwannauer, Pontin, & Tai, 2013). Moreover, both the
development of depressive symptoms (Broderick & Korteland, 2004) and the onset and duration
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of depressive episodes (Robinson & Alloy, 2003) appear to be predicted by rumination.
Additional longitudinal studies found that rumination predicted alcohol abuse (Caselli, Ferretti,
Leoni, Rebecchi, Rovetto, & Spada, 2010), eating disorders, and general substance abuse
(Nolen-Hoeksema, Stice, Wade, & Bohon, 2007). Furthermore, rumination has been determined
to be associated with decreased odds of remission from cognitive therapy for individuals with
MDD (Jones, Siegle, & Thase, 2008).
Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) originally conceptualized rumination as an element of the
Response Styles Theory (RST), which considers an individual’s type of response (rumination or
distraction) that may intensify depressive symptoms. Expanding upon this theory, individuals
engaging in ruminative thought have been found to subsequently prolong their depressed mood
as they continuously engage in thinking about their depressive symptoms and the consequences
that accompany them. Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991) then determined that victims of the
1989 earthquake that occurred in the San Francisco Bay area, who responded in a ruminative
style had experienced significantly higher levels of depression compared to those who used the
distraction-based style.
Other studies have been conducted to better understand the role of rumination in the
development and maintenance of depression (Smith & Alloy, 2009). For instance, based on
experimental methodology, depressed individuals with induced ruminative thinking tended to
have a lack of inhibitory executive control, as measured by their higher count scores on a random
generative task (i.e., participants’ executive resources are occupied by their ruminative thoughts
and thus disrupt their prepotent responses; Watkins & Brown, 2002). Furthermore, rumination
has been demonstrated to not only lead to an onset of a future depressive episode (Just & Alloy,
1997), but to lead to more severe depressive episodes as well (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). It is
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likely that this increase in severity and duration occurs due to difficulties experienced in
attempting to discontinue ruminative thinking (Hawksley & Davey, 2010). In particular,
rumination may serve as an ineffective strategy to relieve stress and allow individuals to attempt
to resolve underlying issues that result from their depression (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001,
2003). Continued research is nevertheless still needed to examine rumination’s role in MDD.
To better understand rumination, researchers have often incorporated models that best
explain worry and its underlying mechanisms. Worry is a cognitive process similar to rumination
in that they both have been referred to as repetitive negative thinking (Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden,
& Craske, 2000; McEvoy, Mahoney, & Moulds, 2010), and both have been determined to be
associated with anxiety, as expected (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), and depression (Molina,
Borkovec, Peasley, & Person, 1998). Although both are forms of repetitive negative thinking, a
primary distinction is that worry is often directed towards future events (Borkovec, Ray, &
Stober, 1998) whereas rumination tends to be oriented at the past and/or present (Watkins, 2008).
Overall, based on the similarities between these constructs, it is possible that models originally
focused on the underlying mechanisms of worry, be applicable to rumination.
One such model, the mood-as-input hypothesis (MAIH), predicts that an individual’s
mood and pre-existing stop rule (i.e., rules or guidelines that one uses to decide when to
discontinue perseveration) impact how persistent that individual is on a perseverative task, such
as worry (Martin, Achee, Ward, & Harlow, 1993). According to this hypothesis, mood may
prompt individuals to question whether a problem-solving task has been successfully completed.
For instance, negative moods may facilitate more persistence on a task as individuals may feel
that they have not successfully reached their goal (Martin et al., 1993; Schwarz & Bless, 1991).
Stop rules, another facet of the MAIH, help define the goal(s) of a perseverative task. Meeten
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and Davey (2012) have identified two stop-rules: the as-many-as-can (AMA) stop-rule and the
feel-like (FL) stop-rule. For the AMA stop-rule, individuals persist on a perseverative task for as
long as they are able to, and individuals using the FL stop-rule are directed to persist until they
wish to discontinue the task. Previous studies have identified that the AMA stop-rule tends to be
associated with perseverative worry bouts (Startup & Davey, 2001; Davey, Startup, MacDonald,
Jenkins, & Patterson, 2005), as an attempt to address all possible worry-related concerns. In
contrast, the FL stop-rule appears to be associated with significantly less perseverative worry
(Davey et al., 2005).
As alluded to above, the MAIH was originally examined within the scope of worry, and it
suggests that individuals who experience excessive worry tend to have higher levels of negative
affect (i.e., mood) relative to those who worry less. Prior research has determined that employing
the AMA stop-rule relates to the frequency of worry, such that higher scores on an “as many as
can” checklist correlated with worry-relevant variables (e.g., trait worry, beliefs about
consequences of worrying, and shame and guilt; Davey et al., 2005). Furthermore, a second
study conducted by Davey et al. (2005) determined that the use of AMA stop-rules led to more
perseveration in a worry catastrophizing task. These studies demonstrate that chronic worriers
make use of the AMA stop-rule to determine whether they should stop perseverating (Davey,
Field, & Startup, 2003; Startup & Davey, 2001). In other words, individuals who worry more
than others are continuously asking themselves if their worry bout has been successfully
terminated, but ongoing negative mood may lead to increased perseveration. This is further
supported by Startup and Davey (2001) in their findings in which worriers generated more
catastrophizing steps than non-worriers when using AMA stop-rules yet generated lesser steps
than non-worriers when using FL stop-rules. This interactive effect suggests that the negative
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moods of worriers may lead to them stopping sooner than non-worriers when using FL stop-rules
but persist longer under AMA stop-rules.
In addition to worry, the MAIH may provide insight on the mechanisms underlying
engagement in depressive rumination. Considering that negative mood, or affect, induces
rumination (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; 1995), the MAIH posits that higher levels
of negative mood combined with a use of AMA stop-rules may facilitate engagement in
depressive rumination. Additionally, this engagement is prolonged due to the positive
metacognitive beliefs about rumination that individuals have as it has been found to serve as a
coping mechanism to regulate mood (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001; 2003). The first study to
show evidence for the MAIH explaining depressive rumination was conducted by Watkins and
Mason (2002). In their study, they instructed participants to catastrophize a negative topic using
either the AMA or FL stop-rules. It was then determined that high ruminators catastrophized
more than low ruminators, which can best be explained by the MAIH in that high ruminators
persist in their ruminative bout when a goal has not been met, as previously mentioned.
Furthermore, the authors indicated that, as predicted by the MAIH, the AMA stop-rule facilitates
this continued persistence to seek understanding of their ruminative thinking, especially for those
in negative moods (i.e., high ruminators). In contrast, the authors suggest that the FL stop-rule
facilitates a need to discontinue ruminative thinking, as predicted the MAIH. Providing more
evidence for this hypothesis, Hawksley and Davey (2009) randomly assigned non-clinical
participants to one of four conditions that combined a positive or negative mood and a FL or
AMA stop-rule. The participants were then subjected to a rumination interview in which the
researcher asks each participant to recall a time when they felt depressed. Following this recall,
participants were then asked to answer what it was about that time that made them feel depressed
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and subsequently asked additional questions based on their responses. The authors hypothesized
and found that participants induced with negative mood and paired with the AMA stop-rule
exhibited the most perseveration. Applying this model to a clinical population had also yielded
similar results in which participants with a diagnosis of MDD were found to persist significantly
longer when using a goal-guided stop rule (i.e., AMA) compared to the control sample of nonclinical participants (Chan, Davey, & Brewin, 2013)
Similar to Hawksley and Davey’s study, further support has been found in a non-clinical
sample in which participants perseverated more on a rumination task when primed with a
negative mood and utilizing the AMA stop-rule (Kissinger, 2014). The author of this study
further anticipated that participants would perseverate more in a positive mood condition and
utilizing the FL stop-rule. However, the author instead found that participants generated more
steps when using the AMA stop-rule. This may be interpreted in terms of mood congruency,
such that the incongruency between the rumination task and the positive, or happy, mood led to
this outcome. As suggested by Watkins and Baracaia (2001), individuals hold metacognitive
beliefs about the utility of rumination such that it allows them to attempt to gain an
understanding of their depressive symptoms, and this, therefore, encourages them to continue to
perseverate until a point of closure has been reached (i.e., employing AMA stop-rule).
Research surrounding mood congruency is sparse. The role of mood congruency was
originally explained in terms of perseverative worry, suggesting that mood, specifically negative,
will lead an individual to retrieve congruent negative content from their memory (Vasey &
Borkovec, 1992) and therefore reinforce their perseverative worry style. In a later study, worriers
were found to persist on a perseverative task even if it was positive (Davey & Levy, 1998),
contrary to the explanation of mood congruency. A similar study by Startup and Davey (2001)
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included primed moods (i.e., negative, positive, and neutral) and asked participants to
catastrophize or reverse-catastrophize a worry. The authors found that perseveration occurred
more in participants primed with negative mood, regardless of the valency of the catastrophizing
task, suggesting that negative mood facilitates preservation for any task and is not restricted to
catastrophizing. Davey (2006) suggests that the two previous findings add difficulty in the
interpretation of mood congruency but do indicate that negative mood plays a large role in
determining how much perseveration occurs and aligns with the MAIH as discussed earlier.
Nevertheless, the current study aims at understanding congruency’s role in depressive
rumination.
Current Study
To the authors’ knowledge, only a small number of studies have investigated the MAIH
and its relation to depressive rumination. Furthermore, it appears that no study has investigated
reverse or “positive” rumination as it relates to the MAIH. Startup and Davey (2001) appear to
have utilized “reverse catastrophizing” for participants in different mood conditions, and they
determined that participants primed with negative mood had significantly more steps in the
reverse-catastrophizing condition than participants in either positive or neutral moods. This
provided some insight on mood congruency in that valency may not be a prominent agent for
perseveration. However, this study exclusively investigated the MAIH and its role in catastrophic
worry rather than depressive rumination. Therefore, more research is needed to examine the role
of congruency in depressive rumination, which is the focus of the current study. In doing so, a
positive rumination interview was constructed, which was based on the reverse-catastrophizing
interview that Startup and Davey (2001) used. This provided an opportunity to further examine
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congruency’s effect on perseverative tasks, such that both mood congruence and incongruence
are investigated.
It was hypothesized that more perseverative steps would occur under two conditions: (1)
a negative rumination interview with sad mood and an AMA stop-rule, and (2) a positive
rumination interview (i.e., asking participants to recall an event that made them feel happy) with
happy mood and a FL stop-rule (see Figure 1). It was also expected that fewer steps would occur
under two conditions: (1) negative rumination interview with sad mood and a FL stop-rule, and
(2) positive rumination interview with happy mood and an AMA stop-rule. A significant
interaction was predicted to occur between mood and stop-rules.
Furthermore, it was hypothesized that participants will default to an assigned stop-rule if
mood and interview task are mood-incongruent, with particularly more perseverative steps under
the AMA stop-rule (see Figure 2). Thus, a main effect is anticipated for stop-rules.
Method
Participants
Participants were students recruited from the psychology courses at the University of
North Florida’s Psychology Department (n = 148), who volunteered to participate in exchange
for course credit. The sample was 79.7% female and 20.3% male, with a mean age of 23.43 (SD
= 6.78). Participants self-reported their ethnic background and was as follows: 65.5%
Caucasian/White, 16.2% African-American/Black, 8.8% Hispanic, 5.4% Asian, and 4.1%
reported “other” or of mixed ethnicity.
Procedure
Participants, in a controlled laboratory setting, provided consent and were randomly
assigned to one of eight total conditions. These conditions were established in accordance to
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which CIP (negative/positive) they would partake in, to which mood (happy/sad) they were
primed with, and to which stop rule (FL/AMA) they were assigned to. The conditions for
negative CIP were Happy—FL (n = 16), Sad—FL (n = 17), Happy—AMA (n = 21), Sad—AMA
(n = 18). The above-mentioned conditions were the same for positive CIP: Happy—FL (n = 20),
Sad—FL (n = 19), Happy—AMA (n = 20), Sad—AMA (n = 17). The overall design of the study
is depicted in Figure 3. After providing consent, participants completed self-report measures
which included rating their levels of happiness, anxiety, and sadness on a visual analogue scale
(VAS) that ranged from 0 to 100. Following this, each participant, based on their previously
assigned condition, was primed with either a happy or sad mood through the use of video clips
from the animated movie The Lion King, which is a similar procedure that has been used by
Meeten and Davey (2012).
After watching the video clips, participants again rated their current levels of happiness,
anxiety, and sadness on the VAS. Next, participants, depending on their previous condition
assignment, engaged in either a positive rumination interview or a negative rumination, which
are both versions of the Catastrophic Interview Procedure (CIP) and were administered in a
manner similar to a previously conducted study (Chan, Davey, & Brewin, 2013). Participants
were instructed to complete the interview in accordance with the paired stop rule. More
specifically, if participants were randomly assigned to the FL stop rule, they were instructed to
discontinue when they no longer wished to continue, and if participants were randomly assigned
to the AMA stop rule, they were instructed to discontinue when they have generated as many
responses as they could. The procedure itself is based on Watkins and Mason (2002) where
participants are asked to think about anything that makes them feel depressed or happy, in the
instance of the current study.
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Measures
The Visual Analogue Scale. The Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) is a 100-point scale that
assesses participants’ current levels of anxiety, sadness, and happiness. For each level, scores are
ranked from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely) with participants rating the degree of each feeling
by leaving a point on the scale. This measure has been used in previous experimental studies
(Chan, Davey, & Brewin, 2013; Meeten & Davey, 2012, Watkins & Moulds, 2005).
Rumination Interview. Two versions of the Catastrophic Interview Procedure (CIP)
were developed and administered by asking participants to recall an event in their life that made
them feel depressed (i.e., negative rumination interview) or happy (i.e., positive rumination
interview, or reverse-catastrophic interview). Participants were then asked to write this event at
the top of the page provided and were then instructed, based on the stop-rule condition they were
assigned, to write down their answer to the question about why X event makes them feel
depressed or happy. This question is then repeated with their most recent answer until they are
unable to provide a response (i.e., AMA stop-rule) or wish to stop (FL stop-rule). Similar to the
procedures of Hawksley and Davey (2010), participants were instructed to limit their responses
to no longer than a sentence such that each response is fitted to each individual line on the
response sheet. Additionally, if a participant cannot provide more responses or repeats the same
response three times (Meeten & Davey, 2012), the interview is terminated. The number of
responses provided by participants was used as the dependent variable and is indicative of more
rumination (Dash & Davey, 2012).

DEPRESSIVE RUMINATION AND THE MOOD-AS-INPUT HYPOTHESIS

11

Results
Mood Manipulation Check
Manipulation checks were conducted to determine if the intended manipulation was
effective. 2x2-mixed model analyses of variance (ANOVA; pre/post VAS scores x sad/happy
mood) were run to compare VAS scores before and after participants’ mood manipulation. An
interaction was expected such that participants in separate mood conditions would significantly
differ across post-manipulation scores. As expected, there was a significant interaction between
the effects of participants’ pre- and post-VAS sadness scores and the effects of their primed
moods, F (1, 146) = 63.02, p < 0.001. However, upon conducting a simple main effects analysis
for VAS sadness scores before the primed mood task, a significant difference was found as
participants in the sad mood condition reported lower VAS sadness scores, F (1, 146) = 4.70,
Mdifference = -7.26, p = 0.03. A simple main effects analysis was also run for VAS sadness scores
after the primed mood task, and a significant difference was found that indicated higher VAS
sadness scores for participants in the sad mood condition, F (1, 146) = 39.64, Mdifference = 24.89, p
< 0.001. Furthermore, Levene’s test revealed a lack of homogeneity among variance in the
dependent variable (i.e., there was greater variance after the mood priming task for the sad mood
condition). For the analyses following the manipulation checks, VAS scores before mood
manipulation were used as a covariate due to the significant difference found above.
The preceding analyses were also run to compare VAS happiness scores before and after
participants’ mood manipulation. As hypothesized, a significant interaction was found, F (1,
146) = 79.68, p < 0.001. Regarding VAS happiness scores before mood priming, a simple main
effects analysis found that participants’ scores did not significantly differ among both sad and
happy mood conditions, F (1, 146) = 0.10, Mdifference = 1.25, p = 0.76. A simple main effect

DEPRESSIVE RUMINATION AND THE MOOD-AS-INPUT HYPOTHESIS

12

analysis conducted for VAS happiness scores after mood priming revealed that participants in
the happy mood condition had significantly higher scores, F = 73.50, Mdifference = -30.95, p <
0.001. Levene’s test also revealed greater variance among the sad mood condition after mood
priming.
Mood Congruency and Stop Rules
Two-way between-subjects analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) were run to compare
mood-congruent and mood-incongruent conditions. In both ANCOVAs, the number of
ruminative steps was entered as the dependent variable while primed mood condition and stoprules were designated as the independent variables. Additionally, to control for the effect of
participants’ sadness, pre-manipulation VAS sadness score was included as a covariate. Prior to
these analyses, three units were removed as the number of ruminative steps for each unit were
over three standard deviations above the mean. To be considered a mood-congruent condition,
participants would have had to have been primed with sad mood and completed the negative
rumination interview or have been primed with happy mood and completed the positive
rumination interview (Figure 1). To be considered a mood-incongruent condition, participants
would have had to have been primed with sad mood and completed the positive rumination
interview or have been primed with happy mod and completed the negative rumination interview
(Figure 2). Variance in the dependent variable among both mood-congruency conditions was
found to be homogenous based on Levene’s tests.
For the mood-congruent condition (see Figure 1), it was expected that the ANCOVA
would yield a significant interaction. As described above, it was hypothesized that more
ruminative steps would occur in the Sad—AMA and Happy—FL conditions. A significant
interaction was found F (1, 67) = 19.74, p < 0.001 and determined that more ruminative steps
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were observed in the Sad—AMA conditions relative to Happy—FL conditions (see Figure 4).
Significant main effects for stop rules, F (1, 67) = 1.50, p = 0.23, and mood conditions, F (1, 67)
= 1.44, p = 0.23, were not found in this ANCOVA analysis.
The preceding analysis for the mood-congruent condition was repeated for the moodincongruent condition (see Figure 2) and yielded, as hypothesized, a main effect for stop-rules F
(1, 68) = 18.39, p < 0.001, indicating that participants that were assigned the AMA stop-rule
generated more responses overall (see Figure 5). A weak, but significant interaction was also
found in the ANCOVA, F (1, 68) = 4.06, p < 0.05. Further investigation shows that a greater
difference between the FL and AMA stop-rule groups within the happy mood condition could be
producing this significant interaction. Lastly, a significant main effect was not found for mood
condition, F (1, 68) = 0.03, p = 0.86.
Discussion
This study assessed the relevance of congruency between mood induction and interview
task valence on perseverative thinking. More specifically, both stop rules and mood were
manipulated while perseverative steps were measured in either a negative rumination or positive
rumination interview.
Previous studies (Davey, Startup, Jenkins, & Patterson, 2005; Hawksley & Davey, 2010)
have found that individuals generate more perseverative steps in a rumination task when using an
AMA stop-rule relative to a FL stop-rule in combination with a negative mood condition. The
current study supported these findings. However, this study is the first to examine the role of
congruency on depressive rumination in which both the valency of mood and perseverative task
along with the effect(s) of stop-rules have on depressive rumination. Remaining consistent with
Davey’s (2006) model under conditions of congruency, the authors found that participants
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perseverated more in mood-congruent conditions (i.e., when sad mood was paired with negative
rumination and when happy mood was paired with positive rumination). Furthermore, under
those mood-congruent conditions, participants were determined to persevere more depending on
the stop-rule they were assigned. Specifically, those using the AMA stop-rule in the negative
rumination interview and primed with sad mood, and those using the FL stop-rule in the positive
rumination interview and primed with happy mood generated more perseverative steps, as was
hypothesized.
It was also predicted that when participants were assigned to mood-incongruent
conditions, they would default to the AMA stop-rule, relative to the FL stop-rule, and thus result
in greater perseveration. The current study supported this hypothesis and suggests that
individuals will likely resort to continuing with a perseveration task for as long as they are able
to (i.e., AMA stop-rule) when confronted with incongruency between a subject and individuals’
mood. Previous studies (Chan et al., 2013; Watkins & Mason, 2002) have also determined that
persistence on a task is typically related to the AMA stop-rule. In addition, it is inferred from
these findings that individuals with a propensity to use the FL stop-rule may ruminate less.
Although participants defaulting to the AMA stop-rule when under mood-incongruent
conditions was hypothesized, this should be examined further. Certain methodological
differences occurred between the current study and other related studies that could explain this
effect. For instance, the current study utilized clips from a movie as the mood induction method,
whereas Hawksley and Davey (2010) utilized music. Although it is difficult to explain why this
occurred, it is possible that the effect is a result solely of the experimental design. All things
considered, individuals’ tendencies to use stop-rules in response to incongruency should be
researched more, especially in various settings (e.g., natural and/or less experimental).
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The current study’s construction and use of a positive rumination interview and its
relation to depressive rumination is the first of its kind. In a study that examined the MAIH with
respect to catastrophic worrying, Startup and Davey (2001) found that participants in a negative
mood perseverated more than participants in either a positive or neutral mood, regardless of the
type of catastrophizing interview (catastrophizing vs. reverse-catastrophizing), and Davey (2006)
suggested that it is difficult to generate an explanation that aligns with mood congruency.
Researchers should examine this further in understanding the propensity of individuals who
engage in thinking about positive content as it may be protective against depression.
The results of this study are likely to have important clinical implications such that
interventions may either be developed or adjusted for clients to cease their rumination episodes.
To reiterate, this study found that stop-rules play an important role depressive rumination, so
interventions may be applied to help clients mitigate their AMA stop-rule use when thinking of
negative content.
Limitations
The current study and its results should be interpreted with certain limitations in mind.
These limitations, however, may be of use in conducting future research related to the current
findings. First, the generalizability of the current sample is limited. This study was conducted on
a sample of non-referred college students which may not be representative of the general
population. Furthermore, the implications of the significant results may not generalize to a
clinical population, so it is recommended that this line of research be replicated with clinical
populations. Second, future research should incorporate an added neutral condition as a control
in which a portion of the participants are randomly assigned to a neutral mood and/or no stoprule condition. Third, it is noteworthy that this study was conducted in a controlled laboratory
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setting and may not completely characterize rumination that occurs in a more naturalistic setting
(Davey et al., 2005), thus limiting the study’s ecological validity. Fourth, the rumination
interviews and their procedures may have been susceptible to experimenter bias as the
interviewers were informed of the randomly assigned condition for each participant. Future
studies may benefit from automating the interview to lessen the impact of experimenter bias, as
has been proposed by Chan et al (2003). Fifth, considering that some participants were asked to
discuss negative content with a stranger, it is possible that they were hesitant to refer to difficult
topics during the negative rumination interview. If this were to have occurred, participants then
may have discussed trivial topics which could have significant impact on the results of this study.
Previous research found that individuals have shown higher comfort when reporting sensitive
topics and psychosocial symptoms to automated systems rather than experimenters (Diamond et
al., 2010; Gadomski et al., 2015), so future research would likely benefit from implementing an
automated rumination procedure, similar to what was proposed by Chan et al (2003) as
previously mentioned.
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Figure 4. Mean number of ruminative steps for participants in conditions in which interview
valence and primed mood are congruent. “Sad” = sad mood condition; “Happy” = happy mood
condition; “AMA” = as-many-as-can stop-rule; “FL” = feel-like stop-rule.
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Figure 5. Mean number of ruminative steps for participants in conditions in which interview
valence and primed mood are incongruent. “Sad” = sad mood condition; “Happy” = happy mood
condition; “AMA” = as-many-as-can stop-rule; “FL” = feel-like stop-rule.

